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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Mr. White never became subject to the Court's 
jurisdiction because he was never served and no appearance was made 
for him. The Court never obtained jurisdiction over the 
partnership because the automatic bankruptcy stay was never lifted, 
the trustee never served, and the general partners could no longer 
act for the partnership because it was in dissolution. 
2. The original judgment did not provide for post judgment 
interest. Because it was based on a promissory note but did not 
specify any interest, U.C.A. 15-1-4 does not allow the judgment to 
be interpreted to accrue interest. Because the complaint did not 
pray for post judgment interest, Plaintiffs limited themselves. 
Amending the judgment now is not allowed. 
3. Equity demands an offset for the value of Stockings1 
property in excess of the price Barbers paid the beneficiary (only 
one day before a trust deed sale) where they only bought it because 
of their judgment. The trial court abused its discretion by not 
requiring an offset for the $20,000 bid Barbers made for one 
partner's interest in real property because they bid at their own 
risk. Failure to require this credit was contrary to the court's 
previous order made during pendency of the original judgment. 
4. The Rule 54(b) Order allows appeal of the trial court's 
refusal to dismiss counts 2 and 3 of the Amended Complaint. 
5. Significant material fact issues were presented to the 
trial court but ignored. The Court abused the review standard for 
summary judgment matters. 
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6. Defendants' presentation of argument and evidence that 
the original judgment had not been amended to allow post judgment 
interest was not an act deserving of sanctions. That this and 
other arguments were made more than once shows not only that 
Defendants believed in their arguments, but also that the trial 
court repeatedly failed to address them. The issues raised by 
Defendants were not considered by the trial court. The Court of 
Appeals did not get to the merits of these issues. Defendants were 
not collaterally estopped from raising them here, and should not 
be punished for having done so in good faith. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
MR. WHITE AND THE PARTNERSHIP WERE NEVER 
SERVED AND ARE NOT PARTIES 
WHITE NOT A PARTY 
Of the four joint obligors, Don White and the Emporium 
Partnership were not served in the present action. Although they 
were named, they were never made parties. Where liability is 
joint, all the Defendants must be sued and served, unless service 
is waived. In this case it was not waived because of the 
restricted appearances. See, generally the cases cited on page 13 
of the Appeal Brief including Pi Hard , L.C. Jones Trucking Company, 
Palle, Garcia, and Madsen. 
Any argument that general appearances waived a requirement 
that Don White be individually served ignores the plain record. 
After Mr. Malouf was served, before Mr. Stocking was served, Malouf 
filed a Motion on his own behalf to dismiss. Record 4-17. May 8, 
1987, Von Stocking, having been served (Record 19) specifically 
entered his appearance and joined in the Motion filed previously 
by Mr. Malouf. Record 27. The Reply in Support oi: Defendants1 
Motion to Dismiss and Strike (Record 28) was made specifically on 
behalf of "Defendants appearing herein". Such reference was 
obviously only to the two Defendants who had each been served and 
who had appeared. The Answer and Counterclaim filed on behalf of 
Von Stocking and Ray Malouf was filed specifically in their names 
July 23, 1987. Record 62. The lead paragraph called attention to 
the fact that Don White was considered by them not to be a party. 
The Answer was filed: 
Reserving the right to answer for Don A. 
White, Jr. if and when he becomes a party, . 
• • 
The second defense in the answer provided as follows: 
The Court lacks jurisdiction over the 
Defendant Partnership, which is in dissolution 
and has filed bankruptcy, and Plaintiff has 
failed to remove the effects of the automatic 
stay under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, and has not 
attempted to name the bankruptcy trustee or 
serve him as a party, all of which is 
necessary to obtain jurisdiction over the 
partnership, and the other Defendants, who may 
only be liable if the Partnership is liable. 
The ninth defense alleged that the Plaintiffs had waived or 
compromised their claims against each of the answering Defendants 
by, among other things, operation of law. This had reference to 
the fact that all of the required Defendants had not become 
parties. There is and was no evidence that a summons had issued 
to be served on Don A. White, Jr., that Don had been served, or 
otherwise became a party. 
When Plaintiffs filed their amended Complaint July 23, 1987 
(Record 66), the lead sentence was that the Plaintiffs restated 
their original Complaint as the first cause of action. They also 
specified that additional parties were being joined as Defendants 
in the second and third causes of action. Those are the parties 
who the Court did not dismiss on subsequent motions, for whom 
relief is requested in this appeal under Part IV in the Appeal 
Brief. Those parties were separately served with summons, unlike 
Don White. 
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After Defendants* Motions to Dismiss the amended Complaint 
were denied, September 23, 1987, they filed the Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, Record 114. The first two paragraphs are as 
follows: 
COME NOW Defendants herein, with the 
exception of Logan Savings & Loan, which is 
not represented by the undersigned, and answer 
the amended Complaint, Counterclaim and Claim 
as follows: 
ANSWER TO FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defendants incorporate by reference, as 
if fully set forth herein, the answering 
Counterclaim filed July 23, 1987, together 
with each of the FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, 
FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, EIGHTH AND NINTH 
DEFENSES set forth therein. 
This response preserved the original Answer and Counterclaim, which 
had specifically excluded an appearance by Don A. White, Jr. 
Answering on behalf of Mall Defendants herein except Logan Savings 
& Loan" was not the same as an entry of appearance for Don A. 
White, who had not been served. "The Defendants herein" did not 
include Don A. White. He was only a potential Defendant to the 
First Cause of Action. Because the original Answer and 
Counterclaim was not filed on behalf of Don A. White, specifically 
said he was not a party and reserved the right to answer for him 
if and when he became a party, the Amended Complaint did nothing 
to make him any more a party than he already was. From July 23, 
1987 onward. Plaintiffs were on notice that Don White had not been 
made a party. If they wanted him included, they would have to 
serve him. They never did. When the trial court said this 
Judgment would be against Don White as well as Malouf and Stocking, 
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the Court exceeded its jurisdictional authority. Mr. White was 
never served, has not entered his appearance, and no answer has 
been made on his behalf. Because no effort was made to join Don 
as a party, Plaintiffs waived their right to join him when they 
proceeded with summary judgment. By electing not to proceed 
against all obligors, they may not be entitled to have judgment 
against any. 
PARTNERSHIP NOT A PARTY 
Plaintiffs admitted the stay wasn't lifted and elected to 
proceed without lifting the automatic stay against the Partnership. 
In the Record, page 20, they say: 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the effect of 
bankruptcy involves an automatic stay against 
the continuance and further (sic) of any 
action against the Partnership. However, 
there are various decisions holding the 
renewal of a judgment with no other action 
taken is not a violation of the automatic 
stay. Whatever the ruling of this Court is 
with respect to that issue. Plaintiffs will 
accept . If the appropriate ruling is that the 
Complaint as against Defendant Emporium should 
be dismissed, the Plaintiffs will not dispute 
that ruling provided that there is no ruling 
that the individual partners are thereby 
rendered immune from a renewal of this 
judgment. (emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs did not cite any authority to support the foregoing 
arguments. Apparently the trial court did not require any, because 
in its Memorandum Decision, the court wrote what Defendants thought 
was nonsense, on page 43 of the Record: 
Plaintiffs are not seeking to bring any new 
suit on any other claim except to re-new (sic) 
a judgment already granted. An existing 
bankruptcy may stay proceedings that is 
working toward a judgment, but it does not 
estop (sic) the Plaintiffs from re-newing 
(sic) a judgment already received prior to any 
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bankruptcy proceedings* 
The Court was at least unaware that all joint obligors had to 
be included in any renewal judgment. Defendants filed a Notice of 
Objections to the proposed form of the Order, citing the lack of 
law to support the Findings. Defendants noted in their Objections 
the Court did not address the question of how a judgment could be 
obtained against the general partners if the partnership was not 
also liable. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on Volume 59A, American Jurisprudence, 
is not adequate to solve the jurisdiction problem. The quoted 
language only goes far enough to say that service on a partner is 
sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction over the partnership, 
whether the partner is served as an agent of the partnership or 
not. Without citing any Utah cases, they argue the Rule should not 
change because the Partnership is in dissolution. However, Utah 
has a specific statute, U.C.A. 48-1-30, which provides that on 
dissolution a partner can no longer act for the partnership. The 
reference in Am.Jur. does not address the case where a partnership 
is in bankruptcy, a trustee appointed and an automatic stay in 
effect. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' argument wholly misses the question of 
jurisdiction on Don White, which cannot be obtained by serving the 
other partners. 
PARTNERSHIP HAS ASSETS 
Without addressing Defendants' arguments relying on this 
Court's decision in McCune, Plaintiffs baldly allege that they have 
seen no evidence that Emporium Partnership has assets. That does 
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not solve the issue of renewing a joint judgment against only some 
debtors. It does not absolve them of seeking assets. McCune 
requires the Partnership be served, made a party, and that the 
Plaintiff exhaust its assets first. The Plaintiffs should have to 
allege and prove the Partnership has no assets to avoid joining the 
Partnership as a party. Now they have waived the right to do that, 
and should not be able to get judgment against the individual 
partners. Plaintiffs acknowledged the automatic bankruptcy stay 
prohibits an action to collect against the Emporium. It was the 
Plaintiffs' burden to get that stay lifted. They did not do that. 
Because it is in the interest of the individual partners to get the 
benefit of the stay for the partnership, they had every right to 
raise this as a defense. 
Finally, the Partnership does have assets. This Court 
affirmed a joint and several judgment against Millenium 
Corporation, J. Ron Stacey and Wayne Johnson, Supreme Court Nos. 
20273; 20282, and an Amended Judgment is entered in Cache Co., Wo. 
18030, for 3158,835.83 plus interest. 
II. 
THE FIRST JUDGMENT DIDN'T ALLOW POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST; 
THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT EITHER 
Most judgments do bear interest. If one that bears interest 
is renewed, interest would continue. Perhaps the trial court 
thought the original judgment allowed post judgment interest. It 
did not examine the original judgment to see whether it could or 
did provide for interest after judgment. Appeal Brief Addendum 
Item 1 contains the Complaint; Item 2 contains the Judgment. 
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Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. says a pleading which sets forth a claim 
for relief shall contain a (1) statement of the claims showing the 
pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled. Even though the 
Promissory Note was attached to the Complaint as an Exhibit, it 
cannot replace the requirement that there be specific averments as 
Rule 8 requires. Since Judgment was rendered in this case on the 
pleadings at the Plaintiffs1 request, there was no opportunity to 
introduce evidence or to amend the Complaint to conform to the 
evidence, so Plaintiffs were limited in their judgment to what they 
had actually asked for without reference to the note. See Girard 
discussion, page 23 of the Appeal Brief. This set of facts 
distinguishes this case from other cases which have gone to trial 
and which may talk about the interest issue being injected by law. 
See for example, Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d. 301 (UT App. 
1987) at 304; Liqnell v. Berg, 593 P.2d. 800, 809 (UT 1979), which 
are easily distinguishable. 
Plaintiffs own arguments limit their relief to what they can 
have under U.C.A. 15-1-4, as argued by their Appellants' Brief in 
Case No. 870128-CA. That Brief refers to one case only. We would 
like to distinguish Dairy Distributors, Inc. v. Local Union 976, 
et al., 12 U.2d. 85, 396 P.2d. 47 (1964), because it is the only 
basis for an argument this Judgment is entitled to post judgment 
interest. In 1963, Dairy Distributors as Plaintiff filed a Motion 
to Amend the 1957 Judgment to provide for interest after the 
Judgment. The Motion was actually granted. The Findings show the 
Clerk of the Court failed because of oversight and inadvertence to 
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fill in blanks provided for interest under Rule 54(e). That Rule 
requires the Clerk to include interest in any judgment signed by 
him if the same has been ascertained. Because of the Clerk's 
omission, the Court applied U.C.A. 15-1-4 and said interest could 
be accrued and collected even though the Judgment had not provided 
it. The Court said in Dairy Distributors that the only issue was 
the lapse in time from the Judgment until the Motion to include the 
interest. The case had gone to trial. 
In the instant case there are numerous additional problems 
that distinguish Dairy Distributors. The instant case does not 
involve the signing of a Judgment by the Clerk or the filling in 
of blanks. The Judgment was signed by the Judge and prepared by 
the Plaintiffs. No oversight or inadvertence has ever been alleged 
in the instant case by the Plaintiffs who now want to have interest 
added in a renewal judgment. No Clerk oversight or inadvertence 
exists. The Plaintiffs filed no motion to correct the Judgment and 
did not collect it before it expired. They are trying to broaden 
its terms in the renewal judgment. Because of the Clerk's omission 
in the Dairy Distributors case, U.C.A. 15-1-4 could be applied. 
The instant case, however, will not justify the interest Barbers 
want to add. The instant case was not entirely silent on the 
subject of interest. It provided a specific amount of interest 
until paid. That language operates as a limitation. Anyone can 
see there was a deficiency in draftsmanship at a minimum, and that 
to provide for accruing interest after judgment one has to read 
between the lines, contrary to the literal words. The instant 
judgment, however, agrees completely with the prayer of the 
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Complaint on which it was based. 
In Preece vs. Preece, 682 P.2d. 298 CUT 1984) this Court 
referred to Dairy Distributors for authority ". . . to do an act 
upon one date and make it effective as of a prior date so that the 
record accurately reflects that which took place." Id. at 299. 
The Preece decision also originated from Judge Christoffersen's 
Court. The Judge said the Decree would be final "upon signing". 
He signed the Decree after Mr. Preece died, but made the divorce 
effective on the hearing date. The Supreme Court recognized the 
trial court's act as a substantial departure from its earlier 
announcement, and directed the Decree be vacated and the divorce 
action dismissed. Mrs. Preece was a surviving widow instead of a 
divorced spouse. This Court said that even nunc pro tunc orders 
" . . . should be the reflection of a previously made ruling." Id. 
at 300. So, as in Dairy Distributors, Preece applied the review 
standard that judgments could be changed only to reflect what had 
actually previously been done. The instant case lacks the 
previously made ruling to support Plaintiff's position. The 
renewal judgment clearly differs from the original judgment. 
The function of nunc pro tunc orders is not to make an order 
"now for then, but to enter now for then an order previously made" 
Id. at 299. Since there was never a previous order in the instant 
case allowing anything more than "accrued interest • . . from the 
date hereof (April 18, 1979) until paid in the amount of $2,180", 
more interest is not allowed. Judge Christoffersen!s so-called 
renewal judgment allowing post-judgment interest should be vacated, 
just as his extra legal action in Preece was disallowed in 1984. 
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The relief Defendants asked for before the Court of Appeals 
was to strike writs of execution. The Court of Appeals said the 
Defendants had not appealed the writs soon enough. No other 
conclusion should be given their opinion. 
The Plaintiffs only hope for interest is some literal 
application of U.C.A. Sec. 15-1-4. The statute in question refers 
to two applications: 
15-1-4 Interest on Judgments. Any judgment 
rendered on a lawful contract shal1 conform 
thereto and shal1 bear the interest agreed 
upon by the parties, which shall be specified 
in the judgment; other judgments shall bear 
interest at the rate of 12% per annum, 
(emphasis added.) 
Thus, a judgment based on the contract such as a promissory note, 
including this case, shal1 specify on its face the amount of 
interest allowed. Since this Judgment does not specify post 
judgment interest, Plaintiffs should be deemed to have not complied 
with the statute, and therefore not be entitled to interest. After 
all, they drafted the Complaint and the Judgment and elected to 
file a Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. 
In Stroud vs. Stroud, 738 P.2d. 649 (UT App. 1987) the 
interest issue was being discussed in the context of one of the 
'•other11 kinds of judgments. The meaning of the word "shall" became 
important. The opinion says: 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, the 
meaning of the word "shall" is usually or 
ordinarily presumed to be mandatory (authority 
cited) Sec. 15-1-4 is a very specific statute 
while Sec. 30-3-5(1) is much more general. 
"When two statutory provisions appear to 
conflict, the more specific provision will 
govern over the more general provision" 
(authority cited). Id. at 650. (emphasis 
added) 
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A judgment on a note must specify the interest. If it does 
not, it is not entitled to bear interest. 
Plaintiffs may say it is only fair to get interest. The 
Stroud Court addressed the question of equity when there are 
conflicting statutes, and said it agreed with Arizona that where 
rights are established and defined by statute, equity has no power 
to change or upset such rights. Id. at 651. Defendants rely on 
the literal language of Sec. 15-1-4 to foreclose Plaintiffs from 
accruing post-judgment interest, where this statute does not allow 
a judgment to add post-judgment interest, and this judgment was 
built on a Complaint which did not even allege the right to it. 
The Plaintiffs did not refute the fact that the Complaint did not 
ask for post-judgment interest; that post-judgment interest is not 
in the judgment; that they admitted the judgment does not allow 
for interest, and that they are dependent on extra-judgment 
concepts to get interest. No dispute is raised about the 
promissory note being a contract, or that the original judgment 
does not provide for post-judgment interest. 
This Court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal 
conclusions because the summary judgment granted in the instant 
case was not granted on facts, but because of a misapprehension in 
law. See Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 
P.2d. 475 (UT 1986) . 
III. 
REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT OF THE RENEWAL JUDGMENT, 
MOST OF IT SHOULD BE DETERMINED TO HAVE BEEN PAID. 
That the Court should do equity is not a new legal theory. 
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No less authority than the Constitution of the State of Utah, 
Article VIII, Sec. 19 provides: 
There shall be but one form of civil action, 
and law and equity may be administered in the 
same action. 
The Courts can administer both law and equity in one action. 
A person who has suffered injury to property may go the District 
Court. If his statement of facts will apply to the law entitling 
him to relief, the Court is bound to grant him relief, either 
legal, equitable, or both. While legal relief may be distinguished 
from equitable relief, the substance and not tne form of things 
controls. See generally Jenkins vs. Nicolas, 63 U. 329, 225 P. 
177. Weyant vs. Utah Savings & Trust Company, 54 U. 181, 182 P. 
189, 9 A.L.R. 1119; and Utah Assn. of Credit Man v. Jones, 49 U. 
519. 164 P. 1029. This Court has allowed Plaintitfs to recover 
money obtained by fraud, an equitable remedy. Kuttes vs. Luke, 59 
U. 324 203 P. 347. 
In the instant case, Defendants seek the value of Von 
Stocking's house in excess of what Plaintiffs paid one day before 
a trust deed sale for the beneficiary's interest. That this relief 
would be equitable is amply supported by the evidence marshalled 
in the Appeal Brief, beginning at the bottom of page 24. The only 
reason Barbers bought the beneficial interest in the property was 
because of this judgment. They would not do this if they did not 
believe they would recover value in excess of the price paid. The 
trial court abused its discretion by not reducing the renewal 
judgment for this, or by not justifying ignoring this disputed 
issue of fact. The matter is not res judicata; it happened after 
the original judgment. If there is no law directly supporting an 
equitable offset, this is an excellent case in which to make it. 
LEGAL OFFSET FOR BID 
During the pendency of the original judgment Plaintiffs had 
an execution sale against the interest of Mr. Malouf in residential 
property. Mr. Malouf set forth reasons why he had no interest in 
the property, but Barbers proceeded anyway and bid 320,000. After 
the sale, Mr. Malouf did not contest the validity of the sale. 
Now, Barbers allege there is an issue on the validity of the sale, 
and want to be excused from crediting their bid under Rule 69(g) (2) 
U.R.C.P. However, that section only applies if there were 
irregularities or the property was not subject to sale. Barbers 
did not allege there were irregularities or that the property was 
not subject to sale. Barbers cite nothing from the Record to show 
Defendants contested the sale after the sale. They did not contest 
it. This Court upheld the rule that "caveat emptor" applies, and 
one reference is Kimbal1, at page 28 of the Appeal Brief. 
The trial court abused its discretion by not requiring the 
renewal judgment, in whatever amount, to be credited by the amount 
of this bid, as it had ordered in the underlying proceedings. 
Record Case No. 870128-CA, Cache County, No. 17630, pages 379-381. 
That was the law of the case. The Court should have found the 
Barbers in contempt of Court under Rule 69(e)(4), instead of 
granting summary judgment against the Defendants. 
Both these offsets should apply to the benefit of all the 
Defendants. In F.D.I.C. v. Bismarck Inv. Corp., 547 P.2d. 212 (UT 
1976) this Court said: 
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If judgment is taken against all who are 
jointly obligated, a judgment creditor may get 
satisfaction from any of the debtors, and the 
one who is compelled to pay the joint 
obligation has his rights to have contribution 
against his joint obligors, and this is true 
whether the judgment is against them or not. 
In the instant case, judgment is not taken against all who are 
jointly obligated. Even if judgment was proper, credit has to be 
made. In the Jorgensen case, discussed on page 29 of the Appeal 
Brief, the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions all agree 
that a bid made on an execution must be credited somewhere. It is 
the Barbers' unmet burden to show they should not have to credit 
the bid under the facts of this case. 
Plaintiffs may have hoped to keep resolution of the legal bid 
out of the appeal by attempting to segregate the rest of the 
amended complaint from their summary judgment. However, the legal 
requirement to credit that bid is independent of who has the real 
rights to Malouf's property. 
IV. 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT IN ITS ENTIRETY IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE APPEALS COURT 
The basis for discussing the issues related in the fourth 
point in the Appeal Brief is two-fold. First, Defendants moved to 
dismiss the Amended part of the Complaint when it was filed, 
(Record 93-99). The trial court abused its discretion in not 
dismissing, based on the arguments referred to beginning at page 
29 in the Appeal Brief. Plaintiffs' attempt to join parties who 
were not Defendants in the original judgment in this renewal action 
need not be supported and is legally unjustifiable. These persons 
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are indirectly interested in the appeal, and were subiect to orders 
of the trial court • 
Secondly, the Rule 54(b) Order signed December 27, 1968, said 
that : 
• . . the Order entered October 4. 1983, and 
all previous orders of the Court pertaining to 
the Complaint, Amended Complai nt, 
Counterclaim, Amended Counterclaim, and Third 
Party Complaint were final and appealable 
orders under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., and there 
is no just reason for delay in allowing the 
Defendants and Third Party Appellants who are 
parties in this action to bring their appeal, 
(emphasis added) 
Thus, anyone who is a party can appeal any order on the Amended 
Complaint. The trial court's refusal to dismiss counts two and 
three of the Amended Complaint are legal questions properly here 
for review. A more thorough basis for dismissing this part of the 
Amended Complaint is in the Record between pages 94 and 111; and 
113. The Court's decision allowing the Amended Complaint to be 
filed against other parties was a final legal ruling, and its 
resolution of the facts is not necessary for a review of that 
order . 
V. 
MATERIAL FACT ISSUES STILL REMAIN 
The Record contains two locations where Defendants summarize 
material issues of fact. First, ten fact questions are enumerated 
on pages 166 and 167. Second, a summary listing of 14 issues of 
fact is on pages 204 through 207. These were distilled into lists 
on pages 33 through 36 of the Appeal Brief. The reason Defendants 
listed them was that Barbers failed to set forth factual issues in 
motions for summary judgment. If there is one material question 
of fact, summary judgment was inappropriate. The following facts 
were not disposed of by the trial court in a way which showed they 
were not material: 
1. The words of the original judgment 
don't allow post-judgment interest. 
The Court has to justify any 
amendment. 
2. Did the appeals court decide the 
question of post-judgment interest 
on the merits? 
3. Mo irregularities were raised oy 
Defendants to allow Plaintiffs a 
claim for relief under Rule 
69(g)(2). 
A. Did the appeals court rule on the 
trial court's prior order in the 
original judgment that Plaintiffs 
credit their bid on the merits? 
5. Why shouldn't the trial court 
require Plaintiffs to credit their 
bid? 
6. Did Barbers take Mr. and Mrs. Von 
Stockings1 property to help collect 
on this judgment? 
7. What is the value of the equitable 
offset due for Von Stocking's 
property? 
8. Was the stay lifted to allow 
proceeding against the Emporium 
Limited Partnership? What facts 
justify doing it anyway? 
9. Did the Emporium Partnership have 
assets? 
10. How can a judgment enter against 
only some of "joint" Defendants? 
What facts allow judgment against 
Don White? 
11. Did all joint Defendants get served 
or waive service of process? 
1 Q 
12. Whether the Barbers should have 
known the lien they filed was 
groundless; and whether it was. 
13. Whether Barbers released the lien 
within 20 days after Defendants' 
written request that it be removed. 
14. What specific acts or facts 
justified the trial court's order of 
sanctions. 
None of the foregoing matters were addressed adequately by 
the trial court. The District Court should not work by magic, and 
should not take Plaintiffs' word about what had happened in the 
case. The Court abused its discretion by not making reasoned, 
rational inquiries of the facts. All the foregoing issues were 
raised before the trial court. They were not disposed of, except 
by ignoring them. If the original 1979 judgment is to be renewed, 
all of them need to be fairly dealt with. None of those questions 
were decided by the first judgment in 1979. 
The trial court should have inquired whether there was any 
genuine issue as to any material fact and, if there was not, 
whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter ot 
law. The statements and evidentiary materials of Appellants 
should be treated as if a jury would receive them as the only 
credible evidence, and the summary judgment below should only be 
sustained if no issues of fact which could affect the outcome can 
be discerned. Zions First National Bank vs. Clark Clinic Corp., 
762 P.2d. 1090 (UT 1988) . 
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VI . 
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ARE INAPPROPRIATE. 
Anyone should see the original judgment did not provide for 
post-judgment interest. Even Barbers admitted this (Record 208-
209). For reminding the trial court of this when it authorized 
writs during the course of the original judgment, and during the 
course of this action, Defendants have yet to receive definitive 
answer about when the original judgment changed. The Court 
offered no legal justification for the change. This deficiency in 
the original judgment was fixed by improvements made to it by 
Plaintiffs and the trial court. That does not make it right. 
There is a legal and factual basis for Defendants1 arguments. 
They should not be penalized for making the arguments. Eventually 
they expect justice to be done. Plaintiffs enshrine themselves in 
a tower unsupported by the Record or the law, and ask the trial 
court to "trust me" about the awful things Defendants did in 
raising these issues. Plaintiffs' brief fails to explain away the 
arguments. There are legally defensible arguments against the 
renewal judgment. There is no basis for granting sanctions for 
having made the arguments where the trial court ignored them. 
Post-judgment interest on the original judgment would require 
some kind of a modification of the original judgment, an 
amendment. Barbers make no showing of where this amendment is. 
A writ of execution is not an amendment. Barbers have never 
attempted to refute this. After the Court's Memorandum Decision 
of May 18, 1987, Defendants petitioned for an interlocutory 
appeal. This was denied July 21, 1987. (Supreme Court No. 
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870232). Now the question of the Court's May 18, 1987, Memorandum 
Decision relied on by the Plaintiff is properly before the Court. 
This decision is in the Record, pages 43, 44 and 47. Perhaps this 
was an attempt to amend the original judgment. The trial court 
said, "There is included in the renewal continuance of interest on 
the judgment. This is not a modification." 
The foregoing statement assumed the original judgment allowed 
post-judgment interest. It does not allow it without going beyond 
the language. The Court has never explained this. The Order 
Plaintiffs prepared to implement that Memorandum Decision extends 
the error by use of "except", implying the Court was allowing 
modification in the judgment to include continuing interest. This 
shows Plaintiffs acknowledged that continuance of interest on the 
original judgment really is a modification. Both Plaintiffs and 
the trial court thought this was acceptable. Defendants do not. 
Plaintiffs next make a personal attack on Defendants' counsel 
for asking for actual damages, plus alternative basi for punitive 
damages in the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. In 
quoting from Defendants' pleadings (Record 119), Plaintiffs forgot 
to quote paragraph 5 asking for $90,000 for breach of promise 
damages against each of the Plaintiffs and their counsel. 
Defendants plead for actual damages, plus ask for damages for 
Plaintiffs' seeking an illegal judgment with malicious intent, for 
abuse of process, and breach of promise. To best appreciate the 
total amount which Defendants requested, reference to page 120 of 
the Record is suggested, where the prayer is as follows: 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment 
against each Plaintiff and Third Party 
Defendant in the amount of the excess payments 
on the prior judgment, general damages, 
interest and punitive damages, plus additional 
punitive damages in the amount of $225,000 to 
each Defendant from each Plaintiff and Third 
Party Defendant, plus costs of this suit and 
legal costs, and for such other and further 
relief as is appropriate. 
From the foregoing Defendants wanted actual damages, costs, fees 
and punitive damages. The punitive damages could only be awarded 
if Defendants proved Plaintiffs and their counsel intentionally, 
fraudulently, maliciously, wrongfully or with gross negligence 
sought an illegal judgment. Defendants have shown sufficient legal 
basis to go to trial on that question. 
After the Court of Appeals denied, for timeliness reasons 
only, the appeal of a writ in the original judgment, Plaintiffs 
apparently thought this was a decision on the merits of post-
judgment interest. It was not. Plaintiffs pretend they made a 
reasonable request for the Amended Counterclaim pleadings to be 
"excised". It is interesting to read the demand. It is in the 
Record, pages 152 and 153. One must wonder why the request was 
made in this fashion. The letter was delivered on Thursday, June 
16, 1988, at 2:00 p.m. It demanded a written response by Monday, 
June 20, 1988, at 1:00 p.m. This Record is devoid of any 
allegations or references, save in this demand, that Defendant's 
had violated Section 78-7-19. In fact, they had not. In the 
demand, Mr. Daines said that he intended to request sanctions if 
the pleadings were not withdrawn. 
After reviewing the intense nature of the demand, the appeals 
court ought to look at the motions filed for sanctions and summary 
judgment in the file, beginning at page 123 of the Record. There, 
it is seen the motions for summary judgment and for sanctions were 
filed June 20, 1988, at 12:16 p.m., about 45 minutes before the 
deadline. We can see just how Plaintiffs' counsel went about his 
business. The Court ought to at least question the sincerity, the 
necessity, and the accuracy of Plaintiffs' requests for changes to 
the pleading. It is interesting to note that the Plaintiffs never 
moved to strike the Counterclaim. 
Damages have been approved by this court in cases of malicious 
prosecution. See Terry v. Z.C.M.I.. 605 P.2d 314 (.Utah 1979, 
allowing 315,000 punitive damages); and Shippers' Best Exp., Inc. 
v. Newsome, 579 P.2d. 1316 U^tah 1978). Even though Terry was 
reversed to require actual malice rather than malice in law (lack 
of probable cause) in the context of another shoplifting case, the 
actual malice standard for punitive damages is sustainable by the 
facts in this case. 
Counsel for the Defendants denies any parts of U.C.A. 78-51-
26 were violated. There was a legal and a factual basis for all 
of the claims raised by the Defendants. That reasonable basis is 
set forth in the Record and the Appeal Brief. Assertions for 
violating this statute could more properly be made against counsel 
for the Plaintiffs. 
Defendants' actions appear to Defendants and their counsel to 
be legal and just, even though justice was foreign to the trial 
court and the Plaintiffs. 
Defendants deny that Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 (1988) 
was violated. Actions not frivolous are defined there to include 
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those for which there is a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law. The arguments to the 
trial court were made in good faith. Even if Defendants should 
have known their position would not prevail in the trial court 
because of those courts* failure to review the law and the facts 
in the file. Defendants believe the Utah Supreme Court has the 
ability to recognize not only that the arguments made by the 
Defendants were made in good faith, but that they are correct. 
Sanctions should never be given to foster a "loser pay" view of the 
court. The appeals court could find the Plaintiffs were 
overreach 1ng. 
Having been challenged by Defendants to show where any Court 
has analyzed the issues raised. Plaintiffs persist in relying on 
glittering generalities without substance. The trial court became 
too trusting in repetitive statements by Plaintiffs that issues 
had been resolved, which in fact had not. It glossed over real 
issues to get rid of the case. The Utah Court of Appeals in State 
vs. Barlow, 102 UT Adv. Rep. 28 i.1988) reversed the holding of 
contempt against Mr. Barlow. The Appeals Court agreed the trial 
court committed error in finding contempt, apparently for his 
having persisted in a demand for a twelve person jury. The Court 
agreed that the provisions of U.C.A. Sec. 78-32-3 must be followed, 
holding the trial court committed error by not making the required 
order reciting the facts which formed the basis for contempt. 
The trial court, with encouragement from the Plaintiffs, seems 
to have found contempt based on some idea that the issues being 
raised by the Defendants had already been raised and resolved 
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numerous times. The Appeal Brief explains why such representations 
were false. 
Plaintiffs variously attempt to apply some concept of res 
judicata to bar Defendants from raising their arguments, and punish 
the Defendants for having raised them, by imposing sanctions. The 
trial court obviously believed there were no factual issues before 
it, only questions of law or it should not have granted summary 
judgment. The question arises as to whether certain issues have 
been already litigated or not. Plaintiffs argue that they were, 
and that the Defendants are somehow collaterally estopped from 
raising them in the present action. Collateral estoppel simply 
means that where a party to an action has actually litigated 
certain issues in one action, and those issues of fact have been 
determined against him, he is precluded from re-1itigating those 
same issues in a later action. It comes from the doctrine of res 
judicata. It is a form of partial res judicata because its binding 
effect is limited to the issues actually decided in a prior 
dispute, rather than foreclosing the entire controversy. 
Collateral estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not 
to questions of law. Although a party to an action may have had 
a case or issue decided against him based on the law, this does not 
mean that this party cannot in a different action insist that the 
law is otherwise, even if the action is between the same parties 
or a party to the first action. See United States vs. Moser, 266 
U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66 (1924). The party against whom the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel is sought to be invoked must have had a full 
opportunity to contest that issue in the prior proceeding. One 
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reason sanctions are inappropriate in this case is that the trial 
court never granted such an opportunity to Defendants, 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants stand by the points made in the Appeal Brief. 
Plaintiffs still have not shown how it is possible to pursue only 
some joint obligors. They do not deny the original judgment said 
nothing about post-judgment interest. They have never shown where 
it was changed to allow it to accrue. They did get the trial court 
to agree to their request to add it in, without amending the 
judgment. Not until an effort was made to renew the judgment did 
the Court pretend to amend the judgment. It issued an opinion 
that interest on the first judgment was not a modification. This 
was error. The original judgment was not amended by writs of 
execution, by the Court, or ever. 
The amount owed on any renewal Judgment must be reduced for 
Plaintiffs1 bid because they were aware the debtor had no interest 
in the property before they made the bid. This Court should order 
an equitable offset for the value of the Von Stocking property, 
taken over on the eve of a trust deed sale. A related appeal 
involves Stocking vs. Barber (No. 890141) . The denial of 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is a legal 
issue properly appealed. The Rule 54(b) Order allows this issue 
to be considered. Numerous factual issues remain which were not 
addressed by the trial court, except by ignoring them. The Court's 
summary award of sanctions against the Defendants was not 
justified, even after the fact, by the Record or by the law. 
Summary Judgment should be reversed and relief granted to the 
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Defendants consistent with what has been asked, including payment 
of their costs and attorney f-ees on appeal; dismissal of the order 
for sanctions; a remand of the case to the trial court with an 
order that it credit the bid and have a hearing as to the value 
of the Stocking property; and an order that the Plaintiffs are 
limited in their effort ^o renew a judgment to the amount allowed 
in the original judgment which has not been amended and does not 
include post-judgment interest; and finally an order that the 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment at all unless they can 
legally join all of the joint obligors and first exhaust the assets 
of the partnership. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of May, 1989. 
/ ^ 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Attorney for Defendants and 
Third Party Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of May, 1989, four true 
and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants, Case 
No, 880410, were mailed postage prepaid to the following: 
N. George Daines, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Third Party and 
Counterclaim Defendants/Appellees 
108 North Main, Suite 200 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Raymond N. Malouf 
